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Introduction 
Visits to the doctor are, for most Americans, a chore. We go to 
the doctor not because we want to but because doctors have 
something that we lack: medical expertise.  
When we go to the doctor, we are asking her to transfer a limited 
amount of knowledge about the human body and all of its potential 
weaknesses to us. The doctor pokes us, shines light on us to see parts 
of us that go unseen for several months, directs us to cough or spit or 
urinate or squat, and asks us questions that we may not want to 
answer. Then, in between periods of waiting that vary between 
annoying and absurd, the doctor tells us what is wrong with us and 
what we can do (or not do) about it.  
To say that speech is important to this equation would be like 
saying speech is important to winning a debate; speech is the very 
mechanism by which the physician-patient relationship functions. A 
typical doctor visit is bookended by dialogue between physician and 
patient. At first, the physician asks, and the patient answers, 
questions in an attempt to diagnose the patient. At the conclusion, 
the physician returns to give the patient the diagnosis and the 
recommended treatment plan.  
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The First Amendment protects “freedom of speech”—the right of 
each person to be free from government restrictions on many different 
kinds of speech.1 While the First Amendment does not protect all 
speech, it does cover a vast range of expression. The First 
Amendment gives a person the freedom to wear a jacket with “Fuck 
the Draft” printed on the back into a courthouse,2 a corporation the 
right to give money to support a political candidate or cause,3 video 
game store owners the right to sell violent games to minors,4 and, as 
demonstrated below, a doctor the right to recommend that patients 
use marijuana to treat the symptoms of an illness.5  
At the same time, however, states have the authority to regulate 
certain professions, including the medical profession. To be able to 
practice medicine in a state, a doctor must obtain a license to 
practice.6 The license is issued by a state board and carries with it 
certain obligations and responsibilities—most of which are concerned 
with protecting the vulnerabilities that are an inherent part of being a 
patient.7  
Patients are inherently vulnerable in their relationships with 
physicians because physicians have the expertise—the medical knowl-
edge—that each patient needs. This creates an “imbalance of power” 
between the physician and patient.8 This imbalance can be so great 
that a patient may come to depend on the physician’s expertise “on 
matters of life and death.”9 Indeed, so vulnerable are patients in some 
 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971). 
3. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010). 
4. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011). 
5. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2002). 
6. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) 
(plurality opinion) (noting that the practice of medicine is subject to 
“reasonable licensing and regulation by the state”); Wollschlaeger v. 
Governor of Fla. 760 F.3d 1195, 1218–19 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 884). 
7. E.g., Katharin McCarthy, Note, Conant v. Walters: A Misapplication of 
Free Speech Rights in the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 56 Me. L. Rev. 
447, 465 (2004) (“[T]he states retain the power to regulate the 
professional conduct of physicians, even when speech may be used to 
carry the conduct out . . . .”). 
8. Am. Coll. of Physicians, Ethics Manual (Lois Snyder ed., 6th ed. 
2012), available at http://www.acponline.org/running_practice/ethics/
manual/manual6th.htm#physician-patient [hereinafter ACP Ethics 
Manual]; Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d, at 1214. 
9. Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d, at 1214.  
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situations that a patient “may be . . . at the mercy of his or her 
physician.”10  
Risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities is perhaps at its 
highest when the physician is communicating with the patient, 
because that is precisely how and when the transfer of expertise from 
physician to patient occurs. When a physician tells a patient that the 
patient needs to undergo, for example, chemotherapy as treatment for 
malignant cancer, the patient’s life is altered in an instant. This 
imbalance is exacerbated by the fact that most patients take doctors 
at their word; one can easily imagine that a patient diagnosed with 
malignant cancer and prescribed chemotherapy might try to schedule 
treatment as soon as possible, immediately putting trust in the 
physician’s diagnosis and treatment recommendation. 
Perhaps the most obvious way to correct the physician-patient 
imbalance is to regulate physicians in a way that protects patients’ 
interests.11 As discussed above, states have this power as the licensing 
bodies for the medical profession.  
One common manifestation of state protection against physician 
conduct is the malpractice suit. Using the cancer patient example 
above, if the physician were to make a mistake when diagnosing the 
patient with cancer (and then recommending chemotherapy), the 
patient would, generally speaking, be able to sue the doctor for 
malpractice in an attempt to be made whole again. The physician 
who committed the malpractice could not defend her actions in court 
by saying her diagnosis and treatment were protected by the First 
Amendment simply because the diagnosis was made and the 
treatment prescribed through the medium of speech.12  
All of this is, more or less, commonly understood. What is not 
commonly understood, however, is the nature of the relationship 
between the First Amendment and state regulations of the practice of 
medicine, including regulations stipulating what doctors can, must, 
and must not say to their patients. Indeed, the intersection of the 
First Amendment and physician-patient speech has become so utterly 
 
10. Id. 
11. See, e.g., id. at 1215 (“[W]ithout the protections imposed by 
professional codes of conduct and the law of malpractice, such a patient 
would have no recourse if the physician chooses to abuse the physician-
patient relationship in some way . . . .”). 
12. Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment 
Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 939, 950 
(“Without so much as a nod to the First Amendment, doctors are 
routinely held liable for malpractice for speaking . . . .”). 
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confounding that lower federal courts seem to be issuing conflicting 
opinions each time a physician-patient speech case arises.13  
Only in passing has the Supreme Court addressed the conflict 
between the First Amendment and state regulation of physician 
speech.14 This has left lower courts to decide entire cases on the basis 
of single and isolated statements.15 Because speech is so critical to the 
proper functioning of the physician-patient relationship—and because 
courts cannot agree on a proper legal standard for evaluating First 
Amendment claims in the context of state regulations of physician 
speech—it is my position that the Supreme Court should intervene 
and set a clear standard for lower courts. This standard must take 
account of states’ interests in regulating the medical profession: to 
protect patients’ interests in receiving the best possible medical care.  
If a constitutional standard for physician-patient speech fails to 
take adequate account of patients’ rights to receive information under 
the First Amendment, that standard is insufficient. Moreover, by 
focusing on physician-patient speech from the standpoint of physi-
cians’ rights to deliver information to patients,16 lower federal courts 
are failing to protect the constitutional rights of patients as a class. It 
is the rights of patients to receive information from physicians, much 
more than the rights of physicians to deliver information to patients, 
that regulation of physician-patient speech threatens.17 Thus, it is crit-
ical for courts to analyze any regulation of physician-patient speech 
from the perspective of patients.  
 
13. See infra Parts II, III (examining the holdings of five recent physician-
patient speech cases and analyzing those cases for conflicts and 
similarities). 
14. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 
(1992) (plurality opinion) (dismissing the argument for constitutional 
protection of physician-patient speech in a paragraph).  
15. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 
889, 900 (8th Cir. 2012) (turning on the application of the truthful-and-
not-misleading test articulated in Casey); Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 
880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1262 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (attempting to apply the 
Casey test), rev’d sub nom. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 
760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014); Post, supra note 12, at 944 (“Although 
the Court has decided a number of cases about professional advertising, 
‘the Supreme Court and lower courts have rarely addressed the First 
Amendment contours of a professional’s freedom to speak to a client.’” 
(quoting Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, 
and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
771, 834 (1999))). 
16. See infra Part III. 
17. See Post, supra note 12, at 979 (“First Amendment constraints on the 
regulation of professional physician speech . . . should focus on the right 
of the patient to receive information, rather than on the right of the 
doctor to speak as she wishes.”). 
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In Part I, this Note uses the guidance of scholars to define the 
contours of the physician-patient speech doctrine. Specifically, Part I 
attempts to divide physician-patient speech into two categories: 
physician speech that is equivalent to “conduct” and physician speech 
that is mere speech. As will be discussed in Part II, the lower courts 
purport to use these two categories to distinguish between physician 
speech that is subject to state regulation and physician speech that 
receives substantial First Amendment protection.  
Part II is divided into three sections, each of which explores 
recent decisions by lower courts and their significance on the greater 
physician-speech doctrine. Part II.A explains and analyzes two cases 
from the Ninth Circuit. In Conant v. Walters,18 the Ninth Circuit 
struck down a federal policy that threatened to punish any physician 
who would recommend that a patient use marijuana.19 Interestingly, 
the Ninth Circuit was forced to distinguish Conant in the next case I 
will discuss, Pickup v. Brown,20 which upheld a California law that 
prohibits licensed mental health care providers from using certain 
practices to attempt to persuade juveniles to change their sexual 
orientation.21 Part II.B explains and analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s 
majority opinion in Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida,22 which 
reversed the trial court in the course of upholding a Florida law that 
prohibits physicians from asking patients if they own guns.23 Lastly, 
Part II.C examines the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Planned 
Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds,24 
which upheld state-mandated physician speech regarding the 
likelihood of a patient who has had an abortion to commit suicide or 
experience suicide ideation.25  
Part III ties together the cases discussed in Part II by pointing 
out the similarities and inconsistencies between them in order to 
establish something along the lines of a loose-fitting “physician-
patient speech doctrine.” At the heart of this “doctrine” is a pattern 
of examining the First Amendment rights at stake from the 
standpoint of the physician as the deliverer of medical advice, as 
opposed to the patient as receiver of medical advice.  
 
18. 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002). 
19. Id. at 632. 
20. 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014). 
21. Id. at 1222. 
22. 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014). 
23. Id. at 1203. 
24. 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012). 
25. Id. at 900. 
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Part IV argues that the current doctrine fails to adequately take 
account of patients’ stakes in the outcomes of the cases, as well as in 
the policy created by a First Amendment jurisprudence that looks at 
physician speech cases through the narrow lens of the physician as 
deliverer of medical information. While physicians are subject to state 
regulation, the patient is not. Because patients are not subject to 
state regulation, any law that cuts into a patient’s First Amendment 
rights should receive more than rational-basis scrutiny. Furthermore, 
because the Supreme Court has, time and time again, affirmed the 
First Amendment rights of a person to receive speech,26 that right 
should enter into any analysis of a regulation that abridges that right. 
I ultimately conclude that in order to create a physician-patient 
speech doctrine that adequately protects patients’ interests in 
receiving frank and open communication from their physicians, courts 
must analyze the First Amendment issues from the standpoint of 
patients as the recipients of information. 
I. Defining the Contours of the 
Physician-Patient Speech Doctrine 
“The right of the doctor to advise his patients according to his 
best lights seems so obviously within First Amendment rights as 
to need no extended discussion.” 
—Justice William O. Douglas27 
In order to fully grasp the physician-patient speech doctrine’s 
place in the larger context of First Amendment jurisprudence, it is 
first necessary to understand why some speech by physicians goes 
unprotected by the Free Speech Clause. In this section, I explain the 
conflict between the First Amendment and state regulations on the 
practice of medicine. I will do this by showing (1) why courts might 
uphold regulations that clearly abridge physician speech without 
giving the First Amendment a second thought and (2) why courts 
would not apply the same logic to all regulations that abridge 
physician speech. 
The physician-patient relationship holds, and has held for a long 
time, a very important role in society.28 Patients depend on physicians  
26. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“It is now well 
established that the Constitution protects the right to receive infor-
mation and ideas.”); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305 
(1965) (recognizing a First Amendment right to receive political 
publications via the U.S. Postal Service sent from foreign countries); Bd. 
of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (“[T]he right to receive ideas follows 
ineluctably from the sender’s First Amendment right to send 
them . . . .”). 
27. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 513 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
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to ask appropriate questions and properly explain medical procedures 
throughout the treatment process.29 
Generally speaking, states act as licensing bodies in professional 
fields.30 In order to ensure that the general public maintains a level of 
trust in each particular professional field, states have latitude to 
define minimum acceptable standards of care.31  
Because the practice of medicine operates through the medium of 
speech, defining minimum acceptable standards of care often involves 
rules that compel or restrict speech.32 In Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey,33 one of the few Supreme Court cases to address 
physician-patient speech, the Supreme Court upheld a provision in a 
Pennsylvania statute that compelled physicians to give patients 
seeking abortions certain information. A plurality of the Justices 
concluded that the relevant provision permitted Pennsylvania to 
prescribe the content of this message as part of regulating the 
standards by which physicians obtain informed consent from their 
patients about abortion procedures.34 Planned Parenthood challenged 
the informed consent provision as an impermissible speech compulsion 
under the First Amendment.35 With little more than a few senten-
ces—and two citations to cases that still seem only marginally 
relevant to many First Amendment scholars36—the Court dismissed 
Planned Parenthood’s free speech claim. The Court reasoned that 
there is “no constitutional infirmity” in compelling speech as part of 
the regulation of the practice of medicine.37 Applying the Court’s logic  
28. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (calling the patient-physician 
relationship “traditional”). 
29. ACP Ethics Manual, supra note 8, at 78. (“Physicians must strive to 
create an environment in which honesty can thrive and patients feel 
that concerns and questions are elicited.”). 
30. McCarthy, supra note 7, at 465 (“[T]he states retain the power to 
regulate the professional conduct of physicians, even when speech may 
be used to carry the conduct out . . . .”). 
31. See id. 
32. Post, supra note 12, at 950. 
33. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
34. Id. at 884 (plurality opinion). 
35. Id. 
36. Id. The Court cites to Wooley v. Maynard for the proposition that the 
First Amendment covers the right not to speak. 430 U.S. 705, 705 
(1977). But Maynard involved a First Amendment challenge to a New 
Hampshire law requiring the state’s motto to be on all license plates, 
and had nothing to do with compelled physician speech. Even more 
mysterious is the citation to Whalen v. Roe because Whalen did not 
involve the First Amendment at all. 429 U.S. 589, 589 (1977). 
37. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. 
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to a malpractice claim, for example, it becomes clear that the Court is 
correct insofar as it posits that there are at least some situations in 
which it would be inappropriate to subject a state regulation on 
physician speech to exacting First Amendment scrutiny. As the Ninth 
Circuit has put it, “[a] doctor ‘may not counsel a patient to rely on 
quack medicine. The First Amendment would not prohibit the 
doctor’s loss of license for doing so.’”38 
The next step in defining the doctrine is to address why it would 
be just as inappropriate, if not more so, to simply say that all 
physician speech should go unprotected by the First Amendment. The 
relationship between physician and patient is often a nuanced one. A 
physician is sometimes a friend of a patient, and at other times the 
physician might be a mentor or role model for a patient. Speech 
between the physician and the patient therefore cannot be completely 
controlled by minimum standards of care and malpractice suits. 
Surely a physician can engage a patient in friendly banter about the 
weekend’s football game without that speech being subject to 
regulation by the state. Another example is that of a statement by a 
physician in public and on a matter of public concern. The First 
Amendment would not tolerate a state policy that prohibits 
physicians from speaking out against a war on a city sidewalk simply 
because of the physician’s profession.39 
Dean Robert Post described the distinction illustrated above as 
the difference between physician-patient speech and speech by a phy-
sician.40 “Physician-patient speech” is speech made as part of the 
practice of medicine, such as a physician telling a patient that she 
should stay off her feet and ice her ankle twice a day. Described in a  
38. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1228 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Conant 
v. McCaffrey, No. C 97-00139, 2000 WL 1281174, at *13 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 7, 2000)). 
39. Id. at 1227 (“[A] doctor who publicly advocates a treatment that the 
medical establishment considers outside the mainstream, or even danger-
ous, is entitled to robust protection under the First Amendment—just 
as any person is—even though the state has the power to regulate medi-
cine.”); Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1218 (11th 
Cir. 2014) (“[First Amendment] protections are at their apex when a 
professional speaks to the public on matters of public concern . . . .”). 
40. Post, supra note 12, at 947. Dean Post uses the terms “professional 
speech” and “speech . . . uttered by a professional.” In order to keep the 
focus on speech made in the context of the physician-patient relation-
ship and to avoid confusion, this Note uses the term “physician-patient 
speech” for speech made during the course of the professional relation-
ship (also called “conduct”) and “speech by a physician” for speech that, 
for one reason or another, falls outside that relationship. It bears 
emphasis that the physician-patient speech doctrine can really be viewed 
as a narrow subset of the professional speech doctrine and that rarely 
will there be any important distinctions between physician-patient 
speech and professional speech for constitutional purposes. 
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more general way, physician-patient speech is conduct because the 
speech is inseparable from the act of diagnosing or treating the 
patient.41  
“Speech by a physician,” on the other hand, describes speech 
made by a physician that is not a part of the practice of medicine. If, 
for example, “a physician while examining a patient should stumble, 
twist his ankle, and spontaneously curse, his exclamations would not 
constitute [physician-patient] speech.”42 While this latter example may 
offend some patients, it will not directly affect the quality of care that 
the patient receives and so is not, or, as we shall see below, should not 
be, subject to state regulation.43  
Lower courts have attempted to rely upon the distinction between 
physician-patient speech and speech by a physician by identifying the 
former as “conduct” and the latter as ordinary “speech.”44 Using the 
language of conduct versus speech allows courts to avoid the messy 
business of attempting to describe the different kinds of speech, 
including why each deserves its own distinct category complete with 
an entirely different level of First Amendment protection. A lower 
court will define speech as conduct if it occurs in a situation the court 
sees as an inseparable part of a more general conduct.45 For example, 
when a doctor tells a patient to take two pills a day for a week, she is 
speaking to the patient, but more generally she is treating the patient. 
Lower courts use the opportunity to define the speech within the 
general category of treatment because defining it by the more 
particular act of speech makes it difficult to distinguish from other 
kinds of speech.  
41. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1229 (noting that where a state regulation on 
physician conduct has an “incidental effect on speech,” First Amend-
ment concerns are lessened); Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1203 (upholding 
Florida law as a legitimate regulation on physician conduct with only an 
incidental effect on speech); see also Christina E. Wells, Abortion Coun-
seling as Vice Activity: The Free Speech Implications of Rust v. 
Sullivan and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1724, 
1740 (1995) (“The speech/conduct distinction, a recurring one in First 
Amendment jurisprudence, is grounded in the idea that, while the First 
Amendment protects freedom of expression, it does not protect mere 
action.”). 
42. Post, supra note 12, at 952. 
43. Id. (noting that physician speech is not subject to state regulation if it is 
not part of the practice of medicine). 
44. See, e.g., Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1227–29 (using a “continuum” model to 
describe the difference between regulations of “conduct,” which receive 
little First Amendment protection, and speech about conduct, which 
receives some First Amendment protection).  
45. Id. at 1229 (“Most, if not all, medical . . . treatments require speech, 
but that fact does not give rise to a First Amendment claim when the 
state bans a particular treatment.”). 
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Unfortunately, it is not always easy to distinguish between speech 
as conduct and ordinary speech. At least one court has taken the 
speech as conduct category past the logical limits of the category by 
defining all speech that occurs within the confines of the examination 
room as conduct.46 Another court has drawn a line between physician 
recommendations for how to treat an illness (speech) and the actual 
treatment of that illness by prescribing medication (conduct).47 
One specific area in which courts have had difficulty distin-
guishing between physician conduct and physician speech involves 
informed consent laws.48 Generally speaking, the doctrine of informed 
consent requires physicians to explain to patients their medical 
conditions and all appropriate courses of action that are reasonably 
within the physician’s knowledge.49 The purpose of informed consent 
is to give the patient information in terms that are clear enough to 
enable the patient to make autonomous choices about health.50 Some 
informed consent laws, like the one discussed in Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey, compel doctors to give patients a state-mandated message. 
The Casey Court upheld the law by reasoning that the state was 
simply prescribing the appropriate course of conduct for a physician in 
a certain situation. But what happens if an informed consent law 
mandates speech that goes outside the field of medicine and into the 
field of philosophy? Moreover, what if an informed consent law 
compels a physician to tell patients something that is not accepted as 
 
46. See Wollschlaeger, 760 F. 3d at 1219 (using a “personal nexus” test to 
distinguish between permissible state regulations and state regulations 
subject to First Amendment scrutiny and concluding that the “personal 
nexus” between physician and patient is at its highest “within the con-
fines of the physician’s examination room,” and thus the state is most 
free to regulate physicians within the physical space of the examination 
room).  
47. See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002). 
48. Post, supra note 12, at 972 (asserting that informed consent laws are 
distinct from laws that regulate the practice of medicine because 
“[r]egulation of informed consent . . . controls the dissemination of 
knowledge,” whereas laws that regulate the practice of medicine are 
concerned with “the quality of medical care that physicians are 
obligated to provide”). 
49. Id. at 941 (“[Informed consent] requires a physician to explain to a 
‘patient in nontechnical terms . . . what is at stake: the therapy alter-
natives open to him, the goals expectably to be achieved, and the risks 
that may ensue from particular treatment and no treatment.’” (quoting 
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1972))). 
50. Id. at 972 (“Informed consent doctrine mandates the communication of 
medical knowledge to the end that a lay patient can receive the expert 
information necessary to make an autonomous, intelligent and accurate 
selection of what medical treatment to receive.”). 
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true in the greater medical community? In other words, between doc-
tors and state legislatures, who wins? 
One last gray area in the doctrine of physician-patient speech is 
created when a law restricts speech based on an ideological viewpoint 
but purports to be a regulation of the practice of medicine. 
Viewpoint-based speech restrictions are generally subject to strict 
scrutiny, and are rarely upheld.51 But whether or not a speech 
restriction is viewpoint-based is not always an easy question to 
answer. Even if statements made by the chief proponents of a law 
clearly manifest an intention to be viewpoint-based, courts will not 
usually consider the law as such unless it is evident on its face.52  
Independent of whether a regulation on physician-patient speech 
fits neatly into one of these categories, conduct or speech, speech 
compulsion or restriction, content-based or content-neutral, it is the 
position of this Note that the most important constitutional interest 
at stake in physician-patient speech cases is the First Amendment 
right of the patient to receive frank medical advice from the 
physician. At least one scholar has made the argument that the 
Supreme Court in Casey failed to recognize the First Amendment 
rights at issue from the vantage point of the patient.53 This Note 
argues that recent cases reveal that the lower federal courts have 
strayed even further from protecting patients’ rights. The following 
section analyzes some notable physician speech cases that have come 
out of the lower courts since Casey. In each of these cases, the courts 
fail to take account of the First Amendment rights of patients. 
II. The Physician-Patient Doctrine in Action 
“[P]rofessional Speech may be entitled to ‘the strongest protection 
our Constitution has to offer.’”54 
 
51. See, e.g., Gayland O. Hethcoat II, In the Crosshairs: Legislative 
Restrictions on Patient-Physician Speech About Firearms, 14 DePaul 
J. Health Care L. 1, 18 (2011) (“When a regulation goes further than 
discriminating in content and discriminates in viewpoint . . . the odds of 
withstanding judicial review become even greater, if not insurmount-
able.”).  
52. See Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 906 
(8th Cir. 2012). 
53. Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient 
Discourse and the Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. 
L. Rev. 201, 206 (1994) (“[T]his Article strives to succeed where Rust 
and Casey failed by developing a First Amendment theory of doctor-
patient discourse that appreciates and protects patients’ interests.”).  
54. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 637 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Fla. Bar 
v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 634 (1995)). 
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“To survive First Amendment scrutiny, the government’s policy 
[restricting physician-patient communication] must have the 
requisite ‘narrow specificity.’”55 
“[T]he Supreme Court ‘has given state and federal legislatures 
wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical 
and scientific uncertainty . . . .’”56 
Each of the following cases raises different questions about the 
extent to which the physician-patient speech doctrine protects 
patients’ First Amendment rights to receive frank medical advice 
from their physicians. In Conant v. Walters, a class of physicians and 
patients sought to enjoin the enforcement of a statement of policy 
that the government intended to punish any physician who 
recommended the use of marijuana as an appropriate mode of 
treatment.57 In Pickup v. Brown, a group of state-licensed mental 
health care providers brought a First Amendment challenge to a 
California law that prohibits them from providing “sexual orientation 
change efforts” therapy to juveniles.58 In Wollschlaeger v. Governor of 
Florida, a group of physicians brought a First Amendment challenge 
to a Florida law that prohibits physicians from asking patients if the 
patients own guns.59 Lastly, in Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North 
Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, Planned Parenthood brought a 
First Amendment challenge to an informed consent law in South 
Dakota that compels physicians to warn patients of a post-abortion 
increase in the risk of suicide and suicide ideation.60  
A. Conant v. Walters and Pickup v. Brown 
In 1996, the director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy 
issued a statement addressing California legislation that decriminal-
ized the possession and use of marijuana for certain medical condi-
tions. In the statement, the federal government threatened to revoke 
or suspend the license to prescribe controlled substances of any 
practicing physician who recommended the use of marijuana as a 
legitimate way to treat an illness.61 Seeking to enjoin the enforcement 
of the government’s policy as a violation of free speech, a group of  
55. Id. at 639 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
56. Rounds, 686 F.3d at 899–900 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 
124, 163 (2007)). 
57. Conant, 309 F.3d at 633.  
58. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1209 (9th Cir. 2014).  
59. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1203 (11th Cir. 2014). 
60. Rounds, 686 F.3d at 892. 
61. Administration Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California 
Proposition 215, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164 (Feb. 11, 1997). 
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physicians and a group of patients joined together to file a class 
action suit.62  
The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California issued a permanent injunction against the government 
policy as offensive to the First Amendment.63 On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit directly addressed the question of whether the federal govern-
ment’s statement of policy was a permissible regulation of physician-
patient speech.64 Rejecting the government’s argument that under 
California law a physician’s recommendation to use marijuana effect-
ively functioned as a prescription, the court concluded that the recom-
mendation was protected speech.65  
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that a patient was free to make a 
number of autonomous legal choices upon receiving a recommendation 
to use marijuana. For example, a patient “could petition the govern-
ment to change the law” banning marijuana use for medical pur-
poses.66 The patient also remained free to choose to violate federal law 
by obtaining and using marijuana—or even to reject the physician’s 
recommendation altogether. According to the court, the government’s 
policy statement did not only restrict speech; it compromised the 
physician-patient relationship by “prevent[ing] the physician from 
exercising his or her medical judgment.”67  
One particular point of emphasis in the majority opinion was “the 
core First Amendment values of the doctor-patient relationship.”68 
The court took the position that just because physicians are members 
of a “regulated profession does not . . . result in a surrender of First 
Amendment rights.”69 The court justified this position by pointing to 
exactly what it was protecting by extending First Amendment rights 
into the realm of the state-regulated physician-patient relationship: 
“An integral component of the practice of medicine is the 
communication between a doctor and a patient. Physicians must be 
able to speak frankly and openly to patients.”70  
Having found physician-patient communications worthy of First 
Amendment protection, the court then turned its attention to the 
 
62. See Conant, 309 F.3d at 633. 
63. Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 701 (N.D. Cal. 1997). 
64. Conant, 309 F.3d at 636–39. 
65. Id. at 639.  
66. Id. at 634.  
67. Id. at 638 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 884 (1992)). 
68. Id. at 637.  
69. Id.  
70. Id. at 636.  
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government policy in question. The court held that the policy lacked 
the “requisite ‘narrow specificity’” for restrictions on physician 
speech;71 the government’s inability “to articulate exactly what speech 
is proscribed” ultimately proved fatal to the government’s defense of 
its policy.72 Because the government policy depended largely on the 
patient designating the physician’s words as a “recommendation,” the 
policy could not withstand a First Amendment challenge as it “le[ft] 
doctors and patients ‘no security for free discussion.’”73  
Judge Kozinski’s concurrence deserves a mention at this point, 
and it bears noting that Kozinski’s views here helped form the 
theoretical basis upon which this Note is based. Kozinski begins his 
concurrence as follows:  
I write only to explain that for me the fulcrum of this dispute is 
not the First Amendment right of the doctors. That right cer-
tainly exists and its impairment justifies the . . . injunction . . . 
[But t]hose immediately . . . affected by the federal govern-
ment’s policy are the patients, who will be denied information 
crucial to their well-being . . . .74 
Even though Conant’s holding ultimately found First Amendment 
value in physician-patient speech, and even though the majority based 
its reasoning in part upon the fundamental importance of the 
physician-patient relationship, Judge Kozinski felt the need to write 
separately to emphasize his belief that the First Amendment rights at 
stake belonged to patients, not physicians. The “disparity between 
[the] benefits and burdens” that the government policy created for 
physicians made it so that physicians had much to lose and little to 
gain by either disobeying the policy or challenging it at law.75 They 
could recommend marijuana but would have to do so under the threat 
of losing their license to prescribe other medicine. Because physicians 
would have had little reason to challenge the policy outside a sense of 
professional responsibility, the government policy ultimately harmed 
patients the most, as patients would lose access to the unfiltered 
medical advice of their chosen physicians. This disparity between the 
relative benefits and burdens, Kozinski reasoned, must be considered 
when courts assign and analyze First Amendment rights.76  
 
71. Id. at 639. The court pulled the phrase “narrow specificity” from 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).  
72. Conant, 309 F.3d at 639. 
73. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535 (1945)). 
74. Id. at 639–40 (Kozinski, J., concurring).  
75. Id. at 640.  
76. Id. 
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Eleven years after deciding Conant in favor of an expansive 
reading of the First Amendment in the context of physician-patient 
speech, the Ninth Circuit was put in a position of distinguishing its 
own precedent. In Pickup v. Brown,77 the Ninth Circuit upheld Senate 
Bill 1172 (“SB 1172”), a California law that prohibits state-licensed 
mental health care providers from using “any practices by mental 
health care providers . . . that seek to change [a juvenile’s] sexual 
orientation.”78 The court offered the following explanation for its 
holding: “[SB] 1172 regulates conduct. It bans a form of treatment for 
minors; it does nothing to prevent licensed therapists from discussing 
the pros and cons of [sexual orientation change efforts] with their 
patients.”79 Thus, while SB 1172 prohibited speech made in the course 
of trying to change a juvenile’s sexual orientation, it did not ban 
speech about the prohibited conduct. 
To distinguish Conant, the court claimed that in that case the 
federal policy at issue prohibited physicians from recommending that 
patients use marijuana as treatment, as distinct from a law that 
prohibits speech that is part and parcel of the treatment process. In 
other words, the federal policy in Conant prohibited doctors from 
talking about treatment, whereas SB 1172 prohibited the treatment 
itself, including all spoken words that happened to be a part of the 
treatment process.80 The court reasoned that the following three 
principles governed its holding:  
(1) [D]octor-patient communications about medical treatment 
receive substantial First Amendment protection, but the govern-
ment has more leeway to regulate the conduct necessary to ad-
ministering treatment itself; (2) psychotherapists are not en-
titled to special First Amendment protection merely because the 
mechanism used to deliver mental health treatment is the spo-
ken word; and (3) nevertheless, communication that occurs dur-
ing psychotherapy does receive some constitutional protection, 
but it is not immune from regulation.81 
 
77. 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2013). 
78. Id. at 1222–24. 
79. Id. at 1229. 
80. Compare id. at 1226 (“[T]he demarcation between conduct and speech 
in Conant was clear. The policy prohibited doctors from prescribing or 
distributing marijuana, and neither we nor the parties disputed the 
government’s authority to prohibit doctors from treating patients with 
marijuana.”), with id. at 1229 (“Here, unlike in Conant . . . the law 
allows discussions about treatment, recommendations to obtain 
treatment, and expressions of opinions about SOCE and homosex-
uality.”). 
81. Id. at 1227. 
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Using these three principles to categorize Conant and Pickup, the 
court concluded that Conant fit under the first principle as involving 
speech about treatment, while Pickup fit under the second principle 
because SB 1172 prohibits only physician speech that is an insep-
arable part of sexual orientation change treatment.82 
In the next section, I will explain the Eleventh Circuit’s appli-
cation of the physician-patient speech doctrine to a dispute over a 
Florida law that prohibits doctors from asking patients certain ques-
tions about gun ownership. Note that the court attempted to use the 
Ninth Circuit decisions as precedent in reaching its conclusion.  
B. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida 
In July 2010, Dr. Chris Okonkwo, a pediatrician in Ocala, 
Florida, received a visit from Amber Ullman and her then four-
month-old infant. In the course of a medical examination of the 
infant, Dr. Okonkwo asked Ullman if she kept a gun in her house. 
Ullman refused to answer the question. Dr. Okonkwo then told 
Ullman that he had concerns about his ability to be her child’s 
pediatrician and that she would need to find a new pediatrician if she 
continued to refuse to answer his questions.83 Ullman still refused to 
answer and even threatened to call a lawyer.84 
In the aftermath of the “Ocala Incident,” Dr. Okonkwo claimed 
that asking the parents of his patients questions about potential 
safety hazards—such as swimming pools and cleaning products—was 
his regular practice and that the practice was encouraged by the 
American Association for Pediatrics and the American Medical Assoc-
iation.85 Ullman claimed that the question was invasive and unrelated 
to the medical examination of her child.86  
82. Id. at 1229 (“Here, unlike in Conant . . . the law allows discussions 
about treatment, recommendations to obtain treatment, and expressions 
of opinions about SOCE and homosexuality.”). 
83. Fred Hiers, Family and Pediatrician Tangle over Gun Question, 
Ocala.com (July 23, 2010), http://www.ocala.com/article/20100723/ 
news/100729867/1402/news?p=1&tc=pg. It bears noting that under the 
American Medical Association Code of Ethics, the physician or the 
patient is at liberty to terminate a relationship at any time. Council 
on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Code of Medical Ethics of 
the American Medical Association 342–43 (2012–2013 ed.). 
84. Hiers, supra note 83.  
85. Id. The American Medical Association does encourage physicians to ask 
patients about the presence of firearms in the household and to provide 
parents with information about safe storage of firearms. H-145.990 
Prevention of Firearm Accidents in Children, Am. Med. Ass’n, 
https://ssl3.ama-assn.org/apps/ecomm/PolicyFinderForm.pl?site=www. 
ama-assn.org&uri=%2fresources%2fhtml%2fPolicyFinder%2fpolicyfiles 
%2fHnE%2fHnE%2fH-145.990.HTM (last visited Sept. 26, 2014). 
86. Hiers, supra note 83.  
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Boosted by anecdotal evidence of a problem from the “Ocala 
Incident” and the efforts of some powerful lobbying organizations,87 
the Firearm Owners’ Privacy Act (“FOPA”) was enacted by the 
Florida legislature and signed into law by then-Governor Rick Scott.88 
Under FOPA, licensed health care practitioners may not do any of 
the following: (1) keep records about a patient’s gun ownership if such 
information is not relevant to the patient’s medical care or safety; 
(2) ask a patient about gun ownership unless the physician believes 
the question is relevant to the patient’s care or safety; 
(3) discriminate against a patient because the patient owns a gun; or 
(4) unnecessarily harass a patient about owning a gun.89 The 
punishment for violating FOPA can be harsh; a practitioner who 
violates FOPA can lose her license to practice.90 
In Wollschlaeger v. Farmer,91 a group of medical practitioners 
succeeded in permanently enjoining FOPA as an unconstitutional 
restriction on speech. In defense of the law, the State of Florida 
argued that the law was an ordinary regulation on the medical 
profession. The United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Florida disagreed, holding that FOPA impermissibly burdened 
speech.92 The court characterized FOPA as a content-based speech 
restriction, rejecting Defendant’s argument that the law merely 
imposed a regulation on the practice of medicine.93  
The Eleventh Circuit reversed on appeal, concluding that FOPA 
merely defines the limits of acceptable conduct for a physician during 
the course of a medical examination.94 In Wollschlaeger v. Governor of 
Florida, the Eleventh Circuit took a different perspective than the 
district court, viewing the law as a reasonable measure to “protect[] a 
patient’s ability to receive effective medical treatment without 
 
87. Emily Miller, “Docs v. Glocks” Showdown in Florida, Wash. Times, 
Aug. 15, 2013, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/5/ 
docs-vs-glocks-showdown-in-florida/ (“The National Rifle Association 
helped push the law through the Florida Legislature in 2011.”).  
88. Privacy of Firearm Owners, CS/CS/HB 155 (Fla. 2011), http://www. 
myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=44993&Session
Indes=-1&SessionId=66&BillText=&BillNumber=155&BillSponsor 
Index=0&BillListIndex=0&BillStatuteText=&BillTypeIndex=0&BillRef
erredIndex=0&HouseChamber=H&BillSearchIndex=0 (last visited Sept. 
26, 2014).  
89. Fla. Stat. § 790.338 (2014). 
90. Fla. Stat. § 790.338(8) (2014). 
91. 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (S.D. Fla. 2012). 
92. Id. at 1270. 
93. Id. at 1261. 
94. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1203 (11th Cir 2014). 
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compromising the patient’s privacy with regard to matters unrelated 
to healthcare.”95  
In defining FOPA as a regulation of the kind that does not need 
to be subjected to strict scrutiny, the majority used a “personal 
nexus” test.96 Reasoning that physicians’ First Amendment claims are 
strongest when their speech is made in public on matters of public 
concern and weakest when made in private on matters of private 
concern, the court concluded that FOPA “regulates physician 
speech . . . where the ‘personal nexus between professional and client’ 
is perhaps at its most significant; within the confines of the 
physician’s examination room, where the physician exercises his or her 
judgment to deliver professional treatment and advice to a particular 
patient, tailored to that patient’s personal circumstances, in 
private.”97 
The court went on to cite Pickup v. Brown for the proposition 
that regulations that define appropriate treatments are not subject to 
First Amendment scrutiny. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argu-
ment that questions about gun ownership are not part of the 
treatment process. In support of this position, the court pointed out 
that medical treatment “may begin with an inquiry (‘do you 
smoke?’), followed by a recommendation and . . . counseling (‘you 
should quit because smoking has been shown to cause cancer’). . . . 
[A] physician would almost certainly characterize an attempt to 
convince a patient to cease smoking as . . . treatment.”98 Because 
inquiries about gun ownership could be characterized as part of the 
treatment process—and thus could be defined as part and parcel of 
physicians’ conduct—the state was free to regulate the inquiries. 
The next case involves a different kind of First Amendment 
challenge than the last two cases. Whereas Conant and Wollschlaeger 
both dealt with speech restrictions, the next case involves a First 
Amendment challenge to an informed consent law that compels 
physicians to deliver a state-mandated message before the treatment 
stage.  
 
95. Id. at 1214. 
96. Id. at 1218 (“Thus, ‘[t]he key to distinguishing between occupational 
regulation and abridgment of [F]irst [A]mendment liberties is in finding 
a personal nexus between professional and client . . . . ’” (quoting 
Accountant’s Soc’y of Va. v. Bowman, 860 F.2d 602, 605 (4th Cir. 
1988))). 
97. Id. at 1219.  
98. Id. 
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C. Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, 
South Dakota v. Rounds 
In Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota 
v. Rounds,99 Planned Parenthood sought to enjoin a provision in a 
South Dakota informed consent law that requires physicians to 
provide patients with a written statement before performing an 
abortion.100 The provision at issue in the case—the “suicide provi-
sion”—ordered that the written statement describe “all known 
medical risks of the procedure and statistically significant risk factors 
to which the pregnant woman would be subjected,”101 including 
“[i]ncreased risk of suicide and suicide ideation.”102 Planned Parent-
hood originally challenged the “suicide provision” as both an undue 
burden on abortion rights and as a violation on “physicians’ First 
Amendment right to be free from compelled speech.”103 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit relied 
upon a standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey to uphold the informed consent law. According 
to the court, Planned Parenthood failed to show that the “disclosure 
at issue ‘is either untruthful, misleading, or not relevant to the 
patient’s decision to have an abortion.’”104  
Planned Parenthood argued that the compelled disclosure was 
untruthful and misleading because it implied a “causal link between 
abortion and suicide” that was not established by medical 
authority.105 The court disagreed with Planned Parenthood’s 
assessment of the statutory language, finding that “no language [in 
the statute] refers to such a causal link.”106 The majority held that the 
outcome of the case rested on the appropriate medical definition of 
the phrase “increased risk.” Because the accepted meaning of the 
phrase “increased risk” lacked “a requirement for conclusive proof of 
causation,”107 the state did not need to establish conclusive proof of 
causation between abortion and the increased risk of suicide and 
 
99. 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012). 
100. Id. at 893–94. 
101. S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-10.1(e) (2011). 
102. § 34-23A-10.1(e)(ii). 
103. Rounds, 686 F.3d at 892. 
104. Id. at 893 (quoting Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 
653 F.3d 662, 735 (8th Cir. 2011)). 
105. Id. at 894. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 895. 
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suicide ideation in order to mandate the disclosure of the 
“identification [of suicide and suicide ideation as] a medical risk.”108  
The court also rejected Planned Parenthood’s contention that the 
statute compelled the disclosure of an untruthful message because the 
increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide ideation “to which the 
pregnant woman would be subjected” was not a “known medical risk 
of the procedure.”109 Citing a “relevant rule of statutory construction,” 
the court identified the phrase “to which a woman would be 
subjected” as a “limiting clause” that should be interpreted as 
modifying only the immediately preceding phrase, “statistically 
significant risk factors,” and not the phrase before that, “all known 
medical risks of the procedure.”110  
Furthermore, because the “standard medical practice . . . is to 
recognize a strongly correlated adverse outcome as a ‘risk’ while 
further studies are conducted to clarify whether various underlying 
factors play causal roles,”111 Planned Parenthood—not the state—was 
required to present medical evidence establishing “to a degree of 
scientifically accepted certainty”112 that abortion did not cause an 
increase in the risk of suicide and suicide ideation. In support of its 
position, Planned Parenthood presented the court with a ninety-one-
page report from the American Psychological Association (“APA”) 
reviewing the medical literature on the relationship between abortion 
and the risk of suicide. The APA report found that “the best scientific 
evidence indicates that the relative risk of mental health problems 
among adult women who have an unplanned pregnancy is no greater 
if they have an elective first-trimester abortion than if they deliver 
that pregnancy.”113 Nevertheless, the majority found that the APA 
report merely created medical uncertainty about the connection 
between abortion and suicide. Because “the Supreme Court ‘has given 
state and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in 
areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty,’ including ‘in 
the abortion context,’”114 the Rounds Court held that the South 
Dakota law was sufficiently truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to 
meet the standard laid out in Casey.115  
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 896. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 899.  
112. Id. at 900. 
113. Brenda Major et al., Report of the APA Task Force on 
Mental Health and Abortion 90 (2008). 
114. Rounds, 686 F.3d at 905–06 (quoting Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 
163–64 (2007)). 
115. Id. at 906. 
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III.  An Analysis of the 
Physician-Patient Speech Doctrine 
This Part analyzes common threads between the five cases 
discussed in Part II, with the goal of establishing the existence of a 
loosely connected doctrine. I will start by looking at the most obvious 
similarities between the cases, such as the fact that all involve doctors 
and patients and a state regulation. Then, I will move toward less 
obvious similarities, including similarities that may only be true of 
some of the cases. In the end, I identify what I believe are the two 
most important similarities that exist among the cases: (1) that the 
truly determinative factor in each case is the court’s characterization 
of the purpose of the state regulation and whether that purpose fits 
within traditional spheres of state regulation; and (2) that each court 
fails to consider that patients, in addition to physicians, might have 
First Amendment interests at stake—interests that are not subject to 
state regulation.  
Perhaps the most obvious commonality among the five cases is 
that each involves a state regulation affecting the doctor physician 
relationship. All of the cases, excepting Rounds and Casey, involved a 
regulation that directly prohibited doctors from saying certain things 
to their patients.116 I will identify these cases as the “Speech Restrict-
ion Cases.” In Rounds and Casey, the regulation compels doctors to 
deliver a state mandated message, and so I will call these the “Speech 
Compulsion Cases.”  
All of the courts in the Speech Restriction Cases agreed that 
states could regulate physician conduct, even if a regulation on con-
duct incidentally swept up some physician speech as a part of the 
regulation.117 All three of the courts in the Speech Restriction Cases 
agreed that physicians have a First Amendment right and that this 
right provides varying levels of protection to physicians depending on 
some combination of factors involving (1) the context in which the 
speech is regulated (does it regulate conduct or speech, and is the 
“personal nexus” between the physician and patient a close one?), (2) 
the nature of the state regulation (is it a content-based, or viewpoint-
 
116. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002) (federal policy prohibit-
ing physician recommendations of marijuana); Pickup v. Brown, 
740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014) (sexual orientation change efforts law); 
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(discussing the FOPA). 
117. Conant, 309 F.3d at 639 (“Our decision is consistent with principles of 
federalism that have left states as the primary regulators of professional 
conduct.”); Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1229 (finding that the state’s power to 
regulate professional speech is greatest where the regulation is directed 
at professional conduct); Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1218 (noting the 
states’ “long-established authority” to regulate physician conduct). 
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based, speech restriction?), and (3) the purpose of the regulation 
(does it do similar things as other state regulations on the practice of 
medicine, like protect privacy interests?).  
Breaking down these factors, each court agreed that content- and 
viewpoint-based restrictions should receive strict scrutiny.118 There 
was, however, disagreement between the district court and appellate 
court in Wollschlaeger regarding whether or not the FOPA was a 
content-based speech restriction. And while the Eleventh Circuit in 
Wollschlaeger was the only court to emphasize the fact that the law 
at issue only affected physician speech that occurs in the “private 
confines of the examination room,”119 all of the courts in the Speech 
Restriction Cases at least mentioned that speech by a physician in 
public on a matter of public concern would receive full First 
Amendment protection.120 Lastly, and most significantly, all of the 
cases noted the importance of the state’s purpose for having the 
regulation.121  
In fact, a close examination of each case, including the Speech 
Compulsion Cases, will show that the court’s characterization of the 
purpose of the regulation at issue proved to be determinative in the 
outcome of the case.  
For example, in Conant, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
only legitimate purpose the federal government could have for 
prohibiting physicians from recommending marijuana to patients was 
to prevent physicians from helping patients obtain marijuana, a 
purpose that was already covered by existing criminal laws that 
prohibited “aiding and abetting” the possession of a controlled sub-
stance.122 Since controlled substances were already covered by rules 
 
118. Conant, 309 F.3d at 637 (“[C]ontent-based restrictions on speech are 
‘presumptively invalid.’” (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377, 382 (1992))); Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231 (“[C]ontent- or viewpoint-
based regulation[s] . . . must be closely scrutinized.”); Wollschlaeger, 760 
F.3d at 1239 (“Content-based statutes . . . are presumptively invalid.” 
(quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382)). 
119. Compare Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1219 (finding that the need for 
state regulation of physician conduct is at its highest in “the 
examination room”), with Conant, 309 F.3d 629 (no discussion of the 
physical location of the regulated conduct), and Pickup, 740 F. 3d 1208 
(no discussion of physical location). 
120. See supra note 118. 
121. Conant, 309 F.3d at 637 (to control drug trafficking); Pickup, 740 F.3d 
at 1223 (to protect juveniles); Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d 1195 (to protect 
patients’ privacy); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 
686 F.3d 889, 892 (8th Cir. 2012) (to ensure patients give informed 
consent to abortion procedure); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (to protect informed consent). 
122. Conant, 309 F.3d at 635–36 (“A doctor’s anticipation of patient con-
duct, however, does not translate into aiding and abetting, or conspir-
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outside those directly concerning state regulation of professional con-
duct, and because recommendations were not equivalent to prescript-
ions in this regard, the Conant Court found that the purpose behind 
the federal policy could not justify its infringement on physician 
speech.  
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit concluded in Wollschlaeger that 
the purpose of FOPA was to protect patients’ privacy on matters 
deemed irrelevant to medical care.123 The court conceded that pro-
fessional rules already protect patients’ privacy in a general way but 
ultimately reasoned that that fact alone would not prevent the state 
from providing an extra safeguard by defining specific boundaries in 
regards to the kind of information doctors can ask for and keep.124 The 
court even dismissed the idea that the conduct versus speech 
distinction could determine the outcome in the case, because “the line 
between treatment and communication about treatment is not 
necessarily . . . clear.” Thus, the purpose of protecting the privacy 
interests of patients, more than the application of a fungible conduct-
versus-speech test, proved to be the difference between strict constitu-
tional scrutiny and none at all.  
Even in Rounds, the court framed the issue around the purpose of 
the statute in regards to regulating the medical profession. The court 
concluded that the informed consent law passed constitutional scrut-
iny not only because it found the law to be truthful and not mislead-
ing, but also because the law provided very specific directions to 
physicians concerning an area of medicine that has been subject to 
state regulation for a long time: the process of obtaining informed 
consent from patients before performing a certain course of treatment 
or procedure.125  
Even though the courts do not directly state it as the constitu-
tional standard for physician-patient speech cases, it is the purpose of 
the state regulation, as determined by the courts, that proves to be 
the most critical and determinative factor in physician-patient speech 
cases. If a court finds that a regulation serves the same interests as 
 
acy. A doctor would aid and abet by acting with the specific intent to 
provide a patient with the means to acquire marijuana.”). 
123. Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1203 (“The Act seeks to protect patients’ 
privacy by restricting irrelevant inquiry and record-keeping by physi-
cians regarding firearms.”). 
124. Id. at 1215 (“The Act merely reaffirms the boundaries surrounding what 
constitutes good medical practice by codifying into law this common-
sense proposition, and serves the important purpose of protecting the 
privacy rights of patients who do not wish to answer questions about 
irrelevant and private matters.”). 
125. Rounds, 686 F.3d at 893 (emphasizing that the South Dakota law at 
issue only compels physician speech as part of the process of obtaining 
informed consent from patients). 
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traditional state regulations, such as regulations that protect privacy 
or, as in Pickup, the unique interests of juveniles, then the court will 
almost certainly uphold the restriction (as long as it is not a content- 
or viewpoint-based restriction). On the other hand, if a court cannot 
find a basis in a traditional area of state regulation of physician 
speech, then it is more likely to subject the regulation to strict 
scrutiny. 
There is one last similarity between the cases discussed in Part II. 
All of the courts in those cases, with the possible exception of Conant, 
treated the physician as the “active player” in the case, meaning the 
person whose First Amendment rights were either violated by the 
regulation or not. This makes sense on the surface, as all of the 
regulations at issue are directed at physicians; in each case, it is the 
physician who is given a choice to either follow the regulation or face 
reprimand. But that fact alone does not mean that the physician is 
the only one whose First Amendment rights are implicated. 
As discussed in Part IV below, the First Amendment includes the 
right to receive information. Because patients go to doctors to obtain 
information, patients have a First Amendment interest in state regu-
lations that affect physician speech. This First Amendment interest in 
receiving information is almost entirely lost in the physician-patient 
speech jurisprudence. Moreover, because patients are not licensed by 
the state, and thus are not subject to special state regulations that 
may infringe on First Amendment interests, the lower courts are 
failing to do a large part of the appropriate analysis. 
IV. Toward a Patient-Centered Understanding 
of the First Amendment 
The majority opinions in Conant, Pickup, Wollschlaeger, and 
Rounds (and even the Casey plurality) each analyzed the First 
Amendment issues from the standpoint of physicians’ free speech 
rights.126 It is my position that in contrast to this physician-centered 
approach to free speech, it was the rights of patients as receivers of 
medical information that were actually at stake in those cases. By 
failing to fully consider patients’ First Amendment rights, the courts 
in all of these cases left out the central constitutional issue: whether 
the law or order in question infringed on patients’ rights to receive 
frank and free-flowing medical advice from their physicians. In order 
to make the case for this patient-based theory of free speech, I will 
first argue that such an approach to the First Amendment is rooted 
in precedent. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that the First 
Amendment protects the right to receive information to the same 
 
126. See supra Part II. 
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degree as the right to speak it.127 The Court has applied this interpre-
tation of free speech in a vast range of factual scenarios, from the 
right of a wife to receive mail from her incarcerated husband128 to the 
right of consumers to receive the prices of prescription drugs from 
advertisers.129 The right to receive information under the First Am-
endment commonly comes up in the context of commercial speech. In 
those cases, the Court has reasoned that the First Amendment serves 
to protect the “informational function of advertising.”130 Exploring the 
right to receive information from the standpoint of the marketplace 
theory of the First Amendment, Justice Brennan observed that “[i]t 
would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no 
buyers.”131 
In Wollschlaeger, the court held that “there is no ‘constitutional 
infirmity’ where the speech rights of physicians are ‘implicated, but 
only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable 
licensing and regulation by the State.’”132 The court did not consider 
applying a patient-based theory of the First Amendment, which 
would have recognized the right of patients to receive the full range of 
information that a physician could give about the potential health 
risks that are inherent to gun ownership.133 Likewise, in Rounds, the 
court framed its holding from the standpoint of physicians: “the 
suicide advisory presents neither an undue burden on abortion rights 
nor a violation of physicians’ free speech rights.”134 In so doing, the 
court ignored that the suicide advisory effectively prevented patients  
127. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“It is now well 
established that the Constitution protects the right to receive inform-
ation and ideas.”); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) 
(recognizing a First Amendment right to receive political publications 
via the U.S. Postal Service sent from foreign countries); Bd. of Educ. v. 
Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (“[T]he right to receive ideas follows 
ineluctably from the sender’s First Amendment right to send them.”).  
128. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).  
129. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748 (1976). 
130. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 
447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980); see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (“First 
Amendment protection [of] commercial speech is justified principally by 
the value to consumers of the information such speech provides . . . .”).  
131. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
132. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1219 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834 
(1992)). 
133. Id. 
134. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 906 
(8th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). 
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from receiving additional relevant information on the subject from 
their physicians. Even the Conant majority, while acknowledging the 
“core First Amendment interests of doctors and patients”135 and the 
“‘imperative need for confidence and trust’ inherent in the doctor-
patient relationship,”136 failed to adequately explain the rationale for 
protecting the communication from the patient’s side of the relation-
ship.137 
Only Judge Kozinski’s concurring opinion in Conant gives 
adequate attention to the distinction between protecting the First 
Amendment rights of patients to receive information and the First 
Amendment rights of physicians to give it. The issue with framing the 
competing arguments from the standpoint of the physician’s free 
speech rights is that “the harm to patients from being denied the 
right to receive candid medical advice is far greater than the harm to 
doctors from being unable to deliver such advice.”138 Physicians adjust 
to laws curtailing their free speech rights and have little incentive, 
outside a sense of professional obligation, to provide patients with the 
best medical advice or to challenge speech restrictions or compulsions. 
Physicians have much to lose from defying laws, however, as some 
speech restrictions—such as the government policy in Conant and the 
speech restriction in Wollschlaeger—carry stiff professional conse-
quences, sometimes as harsh as revoking their license to prescribe 
controlled substances139 or even suspending or revoking their license to 
practice.140  
In contrast to the stake that the physicians had in the outcomes 
of the cases examined in this Note, patients had relatively little to 
gain from the speech restrictions and much to lose from being denied 
accurate and current information. While modern technology allows 
patients the freedom to research their medical inquiries on their own 
and decide for themselves about the relative efficacy and morality of 
medical procedures and treatments, “word-of-mouth and the Internet 
are poor substitutes for a medical doctor; information obtained from 
 
135. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 636 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). 
136. Id. (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)). 
137. See id. at 629–39 (discussing, in the majority opinion, only the physi-
cian’s First Amendment rights). 
138. Id. at 643 (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
139. The government order at issue in Conant carried with it the potential 
repercussion of the government stripping the physician’s license to pre-
scribe medication. Id. at 632 (majority opinion). 
140. The Florida law at issue in Wollschlaeger carried the threat of the state 
revoking the license to practice of any physician who failed to comply. 
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1204–05 (11th Cir. 
2014). 
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chat rooms and tabloids cannot make up for the loss of individualized 
advice from a physician.”141 
Conclusion 
The physician-patient speech doctrine is a dynamic area of First 
Amendment law that—if the last twelve years are an accurate 
indicator—is certain to evolve in the coming decade. It is critical to 
approach speech restrictions and compulsions that affect the 
physician-patient relationship as “strik[ing] at core First Amendment 
interests of doctors and patients.”142 Open and honest communication 
between physicians and patients is “an integral component of the 
practice of medicine,”143 and, especially in certain contexts, is worthy 
of “the strongest protection our Constitution has to offer.”144  
Speech compulsions that order physicians to disclose information 
that conflicts with the weight of medical authority have the potential 
to chill physician speech and thus fail to reflect “the imperative need 
for confidence and trust”145 between doctors and patients. Insofar as 
the truthful-non-misleading-and-relevant standard articulated in 
Casey allows government entities to compel physician speech that 
lacks an established basis in research accepted by the mainstream 
medical community, that standard inadequately protects patients’ 
rights to receive any and all uncensored medical advice that their 
physicians are able and willing to give them. 
Ultimately, because physicians are usually the ones who are 
actively threatened with punishment for disobeying speech compul-
sions and restrictions—and because the stakes are highest for patients 
in the debate about the applicability of the First Amendment to laws 
regulating physician-patient communications—it is critical to view the 
First Amendment as protecting patients’ rights to receive frank and 
open medical advice from their physicians. Whatever standard of 
review courts choose to apply to constitutional disputes over 
physician-patient speech restrictions must take adequate account of 
patients’ First Amendment rights to receive free-flowing, honest com-
munication from their physicians, or else we will continue the current 
trend of inconsistency in the outcomes of cases. Moreover, a patient-
based standard of review would bring cases like Wollschlaeger, 
Rounds, Pickup, and Conant into line with the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence in other contexts. Such a standard would 
 
141. Conant, 309 F.3d at 644 (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
142. Id. at 636 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
143. Id. 
144. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 634 (1995). 
145. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980). 
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appropriately have a greater likelihood of chilling the laws and 
policies that strain open communication between physicians and 
patients, instead of allowing for laws that chill that communication. 
As the Supreme Court has put it, “[i]f the First Amendment means 
anything, it means that regulating speech must be a last—not first—
resort.”146 
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